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THE LIABILITY OF PARTNERS FOR SLANDER.
That the words of one are not the words of another, and that
each individual should only be responsible for the injury in-
flicted by his own independent act is a recognized principle of
law. For that reason the treatise writers nearly all lay it down
as a rule that ordinarily there can be no joint action for slander.
Concerning the question as to whether a partner can be joined
in an action with a co-partner there is no very great weight of
authority. In the recent case of Duquesne Distributing Co. v.
Greenbaum, reported in the 121 S. W. Rep. lO26, it was held
that partners are not jointly liable for slanderous words spoken
by one of them, unless authorized by the other, but that they are
liable as a firm for slander committed by an employee whom
they have authorized to speak, or whose words they have ratified.
There was an editorial comment on this case in the New York
Law Journal in its issue of December I, 19o9.
In this case the plaintiff was a corporation making a mineral
water sold principally to liquor dealers. They alleged that de-
fendant, wishing to injure plaintiff's business, made slanderous
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statements through its traveling salesman, who was acting within
the scope of his authority, that the plaintiff had contributed
money to advance the prohibition.cause and such assertion caused
the damage complained of.
Slander is defined to be "the malicious defamation of a man
with respect to his character, or his trade, profession or occu-
pation, by word of mouth." 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 296.
It is laid down in Cooley on Torts, p. 124, that slander is one
of the several wrongs which in its very nature is essentially in-
dividual. He says: "This (meaning slander) is an individual
action because there can be no joint utterance. He alone can be
liable who spoke the words; and if two or more utter the slander
at the same time, still the utterance of each is individual, and
must be the subject of a separate proceeding for redress."
This may be further illustrated by the following section (113)
from Townsend on Slander and Libel: "Speech is but sound, a
mere vibration of the atmosphere cognizable only by the auditory
sense. From its nature it necessarily follows that the same sound
cannot be repeated; a similar or like sound may be produced, un-
distinguishable in every respect from the first, and of the like
character and signification, but that will not be the same sound.
One who repeats a word previously spoken does not utter the
identical word, but a similar or like word; he repeats a like
sound of the same signification as the first. The two sounds are
separate and distinct, although each has the same meaning.
Hence each publication of oral language is a new and distinct and
separate publication."
In Gilbert v. Crystal Mountain Lodge, So Ga. 284, the court
said by obiter dicta: "Whether a partnership can slander any-
body might formerly have admitted of some question; for it is
an old rule going back to Croke's Reports-perhaps farther still,
that there can be no joint action against several persons for oral
words. The courts considered that if two uttered the same words
simultaneously, the vocal act of each would have a separate
identity and be an individual act; and so actions for such torts
ought to be several and not joint."
There is this exception to this strict rule in the older cases:
Where a slanderous song was chanted in concert by several
voices, the court held that a joint action would lie against all
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the slanderers because each man's voice was only a part of the
whole sound that reached him; that the song was a melody-a
succession of single musical sounds. 2 Burr, 980. And in the
case of State v. Marlier, 46 Mo. App. 233, this particular doctrine
was extended, the court saying: 'If several parties give voice
to the same utterance at the same time they may be proceeded
against jointly as it is an entire offence--one joint act done by
all-and the more there are joined in it, the greater is the
offence."
However, the older English courts held rigidly to the rule that
in slander the words of one were not the words of another and
that the plaintiff must bring several and not joint actions. In
an old case in Gouldsborough's Reports, p. 76, judgment was
given against the defendant for having accused plaintiff and his
family of robbing him. The rest of the family did not join in
the action and it was moved in arrest of judgment by the de-
fendant because the plaintiff alone had brought this action. But
the court held that the action had been well brought because the
slander was several and every one slandered had a several action.
Barrat & Hodsoll v. Collin, io Moore 451; Bishop's Criminal
Procedure (2nd Ed.), Sect. 811 ; Harding v. Greening, 8 Taunt.
42; Rice v. McAdams, 149 N. C. 29; Thomas v. Rumsey, 6
Johns. 26; Hinckle v. Davenport, 38 Ia. 355.
Perhaps the most outspoken opinion on this matter in the
United States is Webb v. Cecil & Vaughan, 9 B. Mun. (Tenn.)
198, where it was held in a joint action against the defendants for
slander of title that a joint action could not bemaintained against
two individuals for slander of title by words-no conspiracy
being alleged. The court said: "The words of one are not the
words of the other. The act of each constitutes an entire and
distinct offence. -The same words spoken by one may occasion
much greater injury than if spoken by another. Each should
only be responsible for the injury inflicted by his own inde-
pendent act." 13 Ency. Pl. & Pr., 30; Starkie on Slander & Libel
(Wood's Ed.), Sect. 410; Newell on Slander & Libel, p. 243; 18
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 1057.
We must not confuse the action of slander with that of libel.
The authorities are all agreed that the doctrine in question does
not apply to written defamation. The court in Thomas v. Rum-
sey, supra, in distinguishing libel from slander said: "This is
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not like an action against several persons for speaking the same
words. Such an action cannot be maintained because the words
of one are not the words of another. But with respect to libel,
if one repeat and another write and a third approve what is
written, they are all makers of the libel for all persons who con-
cur and show their assent or approbation of the doing of an un-
lawful act are guilty."
It was even held at common law that if a husband and wife
uttered similar words simultaneously there were two separate
publications, and that an action must be brought against the hus-
band alone for what he said, and against the wife and husband
for what she said. Penters v. England, i McCord 14. It was
held also that two offenders could not be joined in a single count
charging the offence of uttering obscene language, because the
words of one were not the words of the other. State v. Roul-
stone et al., 3 Sneed (S. C.) lO7.
Without attempting to discuss the liability of a corporation for
slanderous statements of its agents it might be well to say a
word on it because of its somewhat analogous relation to a
partnership.
Odgers on Slander & Libel (star, p. 368), contends that a cor-
poration will not be liable for slander by its agent even when the
agent be acting within the scope of his authority, unless it appears
that the corporation has expressly directed him to speak the
words; that slander is the voluntary and tortious act of the
speaker. Kane v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 200 Mass. 265; Pa.
Iron Works Co. v. Henry Voght Mach. Co., 96 S. W. 551. And
in Singer Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 15o Ala. 574, the court said: "By
reason of the fact that slander is the voluntary and tortious act
of the speaker and is more likely to be the expression of momen-
tary passion or excitement of the agent, it is, we think, rightly
held that the utterance of slanderous words must be ascribed 'to
the personal malice of the agent rather than to an act performed
in the course of his employment and in aid of the interest of his
employer, and exonerating the company unless it authorized or
ratified the act of the agent uttering the particular slander.'"
However, Marshall on Corporations, p. 31i, says, that a cor-
poration will be liable for the slanderous statements of its em-
ployees if committed within the course of a transaction which is
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within the scope of their authority. Rivers v. Y. & M. V. Ry.
Co., 9o Miss. 196; Jordan v. A. G. S. Ry. Co., 74 Ala. 85; Phila.
W. & B. R. R. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202.
The courts of Michigan apparently make no distinction be-
tween slander and other tortious acts and hold that partners are
jointly liable for statements made by one in derogation of a com-
petitor and in aid of the firm's business. Haney Mfg. Co. v.
Perkins, 78 Mich. i; Chesbro v. Powers, 78 Mich. 472.
It seems to be perfectly reasonable that greater liberty should
be allowed in the case of words spoken than of writing. The mas-
ter cannot be in a position at all times to control the tongues of
his servants. So while it is generally sufficient, in seeking to
hold the master liable for the acts of his servant's, to allege
that the act was within scope of the servants authority, the better
authority would seem to be that a more lenient application
of the rule should be applied in a case of oral defamation by the
servant. How easy it is for one to slander while under the in-
fluence of passion or excitement! It is true that the principal
ordinarily is responsible for the character of the agents he em-
ploys. But no matter how great the amount of care he may
exercise, it will not be sufficient to guard against an occasional
loss of temper which may lead to the making of slanderous state-
ments.
Quoting from the court, in the case being commented upon:
"A speech by the agent or servant when absent from the prin-
cipal or master is absolutely within his power alone to control.
He may be prudent and discreet, or reckless or careless in his
conversation. He may have his tongue under perfect control;
or under no control whatever, may speak freely about persons
and things, or talk little."
It would appear from a review of all the authorities that where
it is sought to hold a partner liable for defamatory utterances by
his agent or servant (he would be in the position of principal
for the acts of his co-partner), the better opinion is that he
cannot be held if'it is merely alleged that the agent or servant
was acting within the scope of his authority, as that expression
is commonly used. It must be further shown that the principal
or master directed or authorized the agent or servant to speak the
actionable words or afterwards ratified them.
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IANDATORY CONSTRUCTION OF -PERMISSIVE STATUTES.
The Supreme Court of the State of New York in the recent
case of People ex rel, Hilliker v. Pierce et al., 119 N. Y. Supp. 21,
in a broad and thorough opinion reviews and strengthens the
old and almost undisputed doctrine, that an authority to a muni-
cipal corporation, prescribed by the legislature as a permissive
act, if it contained no discretionary powers, would be construed
and enforced as a mandatory duty, this applying whether it be a
so-called governmental function or not. This underlying prin-
ciple, depending on and carrying with it important subsiduary
doctrines, was well suggested and brought out in the case at hand.
Here, the waterworks system of a village of the fourth class had
been extended to supply all but four of the inhabitants of the
village. The plainiff, as one of those who had applied for but
been refused this extension, asked for a mandamus against the
defendants, as the waterworks board, to force them to extend the
system to his premises. He alleged that the statute, under which
the construction had been made, declared: "The board shall keep
it in repair and may, from time to time, extend the mains or dis-
tributing pipes within the village," etc., and that this placed a
mandatory duty upon the board to make the extension asked for.
The defendants, in their justification, argued that the village, in
availing itself of the permissive authority to construct and main-
tain a system of waterworks, conferred by the general act, is
exercising only a governmental authority and all governmental
functions are purely discretionary and cannot be enforced by a
citizen through mandamus.
Undoubtedly a municipal corporation can, in the scope of its
business, use powers derived from two separate and distinct
sources; it may do so as a duty enjoined upon it by legislative
authority or it may do so as a choice of its discretionary govern-
mental powers given to it permissively. The case of Springfield
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 46, says: "The
investiture of municipal corporations by the legislature may be of
two kinds. It may confer powers and enjoin their performance
upon the corporation as a duty; or it may create new powers, to
be exercised as governmental adjuncts and make their assumption
optional with the corporation." The case of Lloyd v. Mayor of
New York, 5 N. Y. 369, also says: "Municipal corporations
possess two kinds of powers; one governmental and public and
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clothed with soverignty-the other private and held as a legal in-
dividual." See also Maximillian v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. i6o;
Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Oh. St. 19. Admittedly then, the
test of construction for statutory requirement and the powers of
the courts to enforce them is whether the power is given as a
duty or a discretion.
Dillon in his work on Municipal Corporations, Sect. 669, says:
"Discretionary powers are not, unless in extraordinary and ex-
ceptional instances to restrain gross abuse, subject to judicial
control, but duties imperatively enjoined may be enforced by
mandamus." But to compel a public officer to perform a duty
concerning which he is vested with no discretionary power and
which is either imposed upon him by some express enactment
or necessarily results from the office which he holds, mandamus
is proper and appropriate.- Pond v. Parrott, 42 Conn. 13; Com-
monwealth v. Allegheny County Commissioners, 37 Pa. 278; Mit-
chell v. Boardman, 79 Me. 469. However, the courts cannot con-
trol discretion but will only force the exercise of that discretion.
People v. Supervisors of City of New York, i Hill 362; People
v. Steele, i Edm. Sel. Cases (N. Y.) 505; Commonwealth v.
Doylertown Supervisors, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. Reports 161.
What then is the distinction in determining when there is a
vested duty and when a discretionary power where the words of
the statute are permissive? Dwarris in his treatise on the Con-
struction of Statutes, says: "Words of permission shall in car-
tain cases be obligatory. Where a statute directs the doing of
a thing for the sake of justice the word 'may' shall be the same
as he word "shall'." (Potter's Dwarris on Statutes and Constitu-
tions, p. 220.)
In the case of King v. Barlow, 2 Salkberg 609, decided during
the reign of Anne and cited as the leading English authority,
the court says: "The words 'shall' and "may' are construed manda-
tory where the statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake
of justice and the public good." In almost the same words the
American authorities have accepted and adopted this theory. In
Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall. 435, the United States Su-
preme Court, by Mr. Justice Swayne, laid down the American
doctrine in these words: "The conclusion to be deduced
from the authorities is that where power is given to public
officers in the language of the act before us, or in equivalent
YALE- LAW JOURNAL
language, whenever the public interest or individual rights call
for its exercise, the language used, though permissive in form,
is in fact peremptory-what they are empowered to do as for a
third person, the law requires shall be done. The power is given
not for their benefit but for his. It is given as a remedy to those
entitled to invoke its aid and who would otherwise be remediless."
See also Lucas v. Ensign, 4 N. Y. Leg. Ob. 142 (N. Y. Com. P1,);
Newberg Turnpike Co. v. Miller, 5 John. Chan. 113; Hagadorn
v. Roux, 72 N. Y. 583. Chief Justice Nelson, in an able opinion,
gathered together the American authorities in Mayor of City of
N. Y. v. Furze, 3 Hill 612, saying: "When a public body or
officer has been clothed by statute with power to do an act which
concerns public interest or rights of third persons, the execution
of the power may be insisted on as a duty, though the phrase-
ology of the statute be permissive merely and not peremptory."
From this unbroken line of decisions it may be gathered that
in the construction of such statutes of permissive or mandatory
powers of a municipal corporation, the test is in the interest the
corporation owes to the public or third persons. If it is an in-
terest that the public acquires in the act; if it becomes a right and
may be a protection; or if it presents a just claim, then it vests in
the public a claim de jure which the courts will recognize and
enforce by mandamus against the official whose duty it is to
apply that right.
CHANCERY-POWER TO AFFECT FOREIGN PROPERTY.
The Chicago Legal News in a recent editorial, Dec. 4, 1909,
made the following comment upon the case of Fall v. Eastin, de-
cided Nov. i, 19o9, by the United States Supreme Court: "We
commend this case as a good illustration of the class of
cases in which it is. extremely desirable to have an authorative
decision' from the highest judicial tribunal in the land, as with-
out s~ch an adjudication the probability is that the opinions of- the
best lawyers of the country would be thoroughly diverse upon
the proposition involved."
This case was decided by the Nebraska Supreme Court in 75
Neb. lO4, but was reversed on rehearing in 75 Neb. 120, the
court finally holding that, "the court of one state cannot, by its
decree, directly affect the legal title to land situated in another
state."
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The facts were briefly these: The plaintiff and her husband
lived for a time in Nebraska, and by their efforts procured some
land in that state. They subsequently removed to Washington
where, differences arising, divorce proceedings were instituted
by the wife. Divorce was decreed and the court having jurisdic-
tion of both parties decreed that the husband transfer title to the
land in Nebraska to the plaintiff in this suit. The husband did
not execute the conveyance to the wife but, instead, conveyed
the land in question to the defendant, Elizabeth Eastin. This is
an action to quiet title to the land and to cancel a mortgage
thereon. The lower court decided first in favor of the plaintiff,
but on rehearing, they were against her. She appealed, and the
cause came up to the United States Supreme Court, which, in
an opinion by Justice McKenna, held: "A deed to land,
situated in Nebraska, made by a commissioner, under a decree of
a court of another state, in an action of divorce, in which in
determining the equities of the parties conformable to the prac-
tice of that state, the land was set apart to the wife as her own
separate property, need not be recognized in Nebraska, under the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution." Justices
Harlan and Brewer dissented, and Justice Holmes concurred
specially, basing his opinion on other grounds than the majority
of the court, and holding that the decree of the Washington court
was entitled to full faith and credit.
Lord Hardwicke established the jurisdiction of the Court Of
Chancery to decree specific performance of land situated in an-
other country where it had jurisdiction over the parties, in the
case of William Penn v. Lord Baltimore, i Ves. Sr. 444, which
concerned the boundaries of their possessions in America.
This case was given as a basis for the decision of Chief Justice
Marshall in the case of Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch. 143, in which
he announced the following rule: "Upon the authority of these
cases, this court is of the opinion that in a case of fraud, trust, or
contract, the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery is sustainable
wherever the person be found, although land not within the juris-
diction of that court be affected by the decree." These authori-
ties firmly establish the rule and have been followed steadfastly
in both countries, so that there is no question whatever of that
proposition. Then, the question arises, what effect has the de-
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cree of a court which has only jurisdiction of the parties upon
the title to the land?
By statute the decree of a court may have the effect of trans-
ferring title. King v. Bill, 28 Conn. 302. But these statutes
apply only to land situated in the state, for it is not within the
power of a court of one state to decree the mode by which real
estate shall be conveyed in another state. Watts v. Waddle, 6
Pet. 389. And, again, in McCormack v. Sullevant, IO Cranch.
192, it is said: "The title and disposition of real estate is exclu-
sively subject to the laws of the country where situated, which
can alone prescribe the mode by which title can pass from one
person to another." And further: "The court has no inherent
power outside of its jurisdiction by the mere force of its decree
to annul a deed or establish a title." Hart v. Sanson, i1O U. S.
15'.
It is an established principle that equity acts only in per-
sonam. "The principle upon which the jurisdiction rests is that
chancery acting in personam and not in ren holds the conscience
of the parties bound without regard to the situs of the property.
The decree imposes a mere personal obligation upon the defend-
ant, enforceable by injunction, attachment, or like process against
the person, and cannot operate ex proprio vigore upon the lands
in another jurisdiction." Lindley v. O'Reilley, 5o N. J. L. 636.
"The decree of chancery has no direct operation on property
and in no way affects the legal or equitable title thereto." Car-
rington's Heirs v. Brents, i McL. 167. "The extent of the power
of a court in such cases is to decree that the person invested
with the title make conveyance of it, which may be enforced by
personal process against th owner, but the decree is not effectual
unless the owner of the land, in person, executes a conveyance."
Morris v. Hand, 70 Tex. 489. In a case precisely similar to the
one at bar the Illinois court, in Proctor v. Proctor, 215 Ill. 275,
69 L. R. A. 673 and note, held: "No interest in real estate,
located in another state, can be vested in a complainant in a di-
vorce proceeding, by a decree which purports to deal directly
with the title to the estate."
"A court of equity will decree the performance of contracts re-
lating to land without their jurisdiction. But, in such cases, the
decree cannot affect the land, but can only be enforced when the
court has jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and thus
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compels him to execute a conveyance. It is the conveyance, not
the decree, that has the effect." Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq.
ii5; Watkins v. Holnan, 16 Pet. 25. Cyc., Vol. xxiii, p. 1548,
thus sums up: "Real property, being governed only by the laws
of its situs, and being subject only to the jurisdiction of the
courts wherein it is situated, cannot be directly affected by the
judgments or decrees of a court of any other state; nor do the
provisions of the Federal Constitution require that a judgment
of a state court should be accorded any extra-territorial force or
effect as regards real property. But, although incapable of act-
ing directly on real estate without its jurisdiction, a court of
equity in one state having acquired jurisdiction of the parties
may make decrees affecting their dealings with such property in
such manner as to bind them personally, and such orders or
decrees may-be pleaded as a cause of action, a bar, or a defence,
in a state where the land lies."
The courts of New York have deviated slightly from the strict
application of the above rule, and have held that "where the
court of New York renders a decree of strict foreclosure on
lands in Illinois and the parties are before the court, the decree
is binding in Illinois under the United States Constitution and
laws, which provide that states shall give full faith and credit
to the judicial acts of another state." House v. Lockwood, I
N. Y. Supp. 196. But that case is distinguishable from the case
at bar, in that, in this case, the decision of the Washington court
relied on, was given under a statute of that state, while the New
York court did not rest its decision on any statute, and was
not trying to enforce a New York law in Illinois.
In Wimer v. Wimer, 82 Va. 892, the court of Virginia said:
"Courts of Virginia have no jurisdiction to partition lands
situated in another state, because such right can only be exercised
under the lex loci rei sitae."
The United States Supreme Court has apparently stated a
rule which carries out the plaintiff's contention, for in Dull v.
Blackman, 169 U. S. 245, they say: "If all the parties interested
in the land were brought personally before a court of another
state, its decree would be conclusive upon them, and thus in
effect determine the title to the land." But an examination of
that case shows that the above quoted statement is a mere dictum,
as the court was not required to decide that point.
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Another case which comes nearer to upholding the plaintiff's
contention is that of Burnley v. Stephenson, 24 Ohio St. 474,
which holds that "a decree of a court of equity in one state,
directing a conveyance of lands situated in another, may be
pleaded as a cause. of action or ground of defence in the courts
of the state where the land lies, although no conveyance has been
made, and unless impeached for fraud, is entitled to full force
and effect of record evidence of the equities between the parties
therein determined." The Supreme Court, in speaking of this
decision, said: "It may be doubted if the cases cited by the
court sustain its conclusion. There is much temptation to fol-
low the rule." But they do not do so, but affirm the holding of
the lower court.
Thus, it will be seen by a review of all the authorities upon
this subject, that the recent decision makes no departure from
the rules already laid down.
